such that " [a] t every level of society, a person's age and stage in the life cycle further ranked him or her in family and community hierarchies of deference and authority." 5 While the terms of Mexican Californian patriarchy were always under negotiation, its framework was embedded in the ancient concept of patria potestas (paternal authority) whereby male heads of household had complete authority over dependents, and obligations of parental respect and obedience prevailed into children's adulthood. Both age and marital status determined the nature and extent of children's independence as adults. Single daughters and sons, no matter their age, remained under their father's authority during his lifetime except under certain conditions such as emancipation or the father's incapacitation. The legal regime supported the patria potestas requirement that children under the age of majority, twenty-five gain their father's consent to marry or risk being disinherited, but once married they were released from his paternal authority. On the other hand, the Catholic Church's sacramental approach to marriage required consent by both parties, thereby at least theoretically protecting children from being forced into unwanted unions. Press, 1990) , 140-142 ("[t] he Californio family model provided the patterns of submission, hierarchy, and obligation that prevailed between patriarchs and their women, children and Indian laborers in the golden age of the ranchos"). 6 Pubols, 26, 30, 58 (patriarchy "was not something imposed from without, but a set of relationships and assumptions under continual negotiation"); Arrom 57, 69, 148 ("in the late colonial period, the Crown increasingly restricted the freedom of marriage sanctioned by the Catholic Church"). Chavez-Garcia notes that Spanish law also prohibited parents from forcing marriage on a child. Chavez-Garcia, 32. Even married children did not gain legal rights until they reached the age of majority; before then they were subject to guardianship for legal transactions. Arrom, 58. Besides the right to regulate children"s marriages, patria potestas gave fathers control over children"s education, legal transactions and property (including a right to use that property), and gave fathers the right to use physical punishment or take legal action against their children. Ibid., 69. During the 1820s and 30s, some Mexican jurisdictions adopted reforms aimed at reducing the authority of fathers, by reducing the age of majority, thus allowing children to marry without paternal consent earlier, and releasing single adults from patria potestas while their father was still alive, but there is no indication that these changes were adopted, either formally or informally, in Alta California. See ibid., 92.
In Mexican Californian society, hierarchically defined by landholdings and the notion gente de razon, the doctrine of patria potestas provided the basis for ensuring that children's marriages facilitated rather than disrupted the family economy. Spanish concerns about marriages between unequals were expanded in the Americas to include concerns about wealth, and landed fathers focused on arranging marriages, particularly of daughters, that would bolster kinship networks and increase the family's economic position. Under Mexican law, property might nominally be owned jointly by married couples or by individual members of a family, but the patriarchal structure guaranteed that family members would act predictably and in unison, not competing against each other. Ranchos were operated under a single manager, father or brother, "enabling the extended kin network to consolidate its holdings and direct management from a single source, and thus to increase its economic power." 7 This meant that married children, including married daughters, remained on the rancho under the watchful guise of the patriarch. 8 7 For a discussion of the status of gente de razon in Alta California, see Lisbeth Haas, Conquests and Historical Identities in California, 1769 -1936 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995 , Ch. 1 passim; Monroy, [22] [23] [139] [140] ; Gloria E. Miranda, "Gente de Razon marriage Patterns in Spanish and Mexican California: A Case Study of Santa Barbara and Los Angeles," Southern California Quarterly 63: 1-21 (1981) . Regarding the father"s right to arrange marriages, see Pubols, [36] [37] athers claimed a special interest in controlling the marriages and sexuality of girls because … a father"s masculine honor … depended on his ability to protect his wife and daughters from sexual dishonor"); Griswold del Castillo, 64-65; Monroy, 140, 159; Miroslava Chavez, ""Pongo mi Demanda": Challenging Patriarchy in Mexican Los Angeles, 1830 Angeles, -1850 In Over the Edge: Remapping the American West, edited by Valerie J. Matsumoto and Blake Allmendinger (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 274-75. Fathers might arrange marriages without their children"s knowledge (Monroy, 140), but Chavez-Garcia notes that daughters were successful in appealing to authorities to block undesired paternal marriage arrangements (278). Pubols (124) notes that daughters were left more vulnerable after Mexican independence due to the weakening of church authority. In the end, according to Pubols (126), most daughters were willing participants in arranged marriages because they identified with their families" interests and saw the marriage as a way to benefit themselves long-term.
As his children matured, Antonio Ygnacio's ability to exercise his paternal prerogative shifted. His first two daughters, Francisca and Ascencion, married in a double ceremony in 1825, when Antonio Ygnacio's patriarchal authority and status in the community was rising, and he chose well: each wed into founding families of Los Angeles, Sepulveda and Sanchez, whose patriarchs, similar to Avila, engaged in ranching and held various governmental posts. Seven years later, Antonio Ygnacio's eldest son wed into the Yorba family, the holder of one of the largest and earliest Spanish land concessions. Through these marriages, Antonio Ygnacio's children demonstrated a strong commitment to strengthening the family kinship network and economy. Upon these and subsequent weddings, Antonio Ygnacio presented each child with a gift of cattle, no doubt assuming that the stock would continue to graze on his land, further investing these now-emancipated children in the family economy. In fact, the 1836 census indicates the married Juan, and his unemancipated, unmarried brothers, Pedro and Pedro Antonio, working Rancho Sausal Redondo along with their father, aided by a new brother-inlaw. 9
However, around the time that Juan got married, a tension inherent in patriarchal authority threatened to disrupt the Californio family economy. As adults, second-generation native sons yearned to escape their fathers' control, establish themselves as patriarchs, and gain the honor that would come with the position. A change in inheritance law after independence left eldest sons particularly vulnerable; no longer could they hope to be the sole beneficiary of their fathers' land, as property would equally descend to all children in the family. But any The process of secularization of the missions, from 1829 to 1846, particularly under Governor Figueroa beginning in 1833, provided an opportunity for the younger generation to gain the land they'd been hungering for and establish themselves independently of their fathers.
Ironically, it was family connections to the commissioners appointed to administer the mission lands that allowed this second generation to free themselves of the patriarchal authority and economy restricting them, and to do so without rejecting the system of patriarchy altogether. The pattern of marriage and land acquisition for the Avila family in the 1830s reflected this new reality, the shift towards independence aided by the appointment of Francisca's father-in-law, Francisco Sepulveda, as commissioner of the deteriorating Mission San Juan Capistrano, sixty miles to the south. 11
Soon after his marriage, Juan received permission from Sepulveda to graze his cattle on the abandoned mission lands. By 1836, Francisca's husband Jose Sepulveda had established himself as an independent ranchero, formalizing his presence in San Juan Capistrano with a land grant in 1837. When, in the early 1840s, the Mexican government established a new pueblo 10 Pubols, 149-195, passim ("[t] o be dominated by another was to be a man without honor"); Arrom, 84. 11 In conjunction with Figueroa"s implementation of secularization while ignoring earlier mandates to provide land to mission Indians, the territorial legislature issued a law that "ordered [] "vacant" mission lands to be granted according to the Mexican colonization laws," whereupon "the floodgates opened, and scores of new grants, carved from mission estates, transferred to the hands of the native sons each year thereafter. and undertook officially to populate the area, Juan, along with his now-widowed sister Ascencion, sought and gained the 13,000-acre Rancho Niguel. 12
With opportunities opening up for the second generation, the ability if not the interest of patriarchs to employ the marriages of daughters (and sons) to bolster the family economy declined. The next few marriages connected the Avilas with other founding families, but those that were landless and thus less elite. Perhaps Antonio Ygnacio was most concerned with adding additional sets of hands to work Sausal Redondo, yet the outcomes of these marriages were more variable and later ones highlighted the social disruption that was creeping into Californio society. Haas, [45] [46] [47] 83; ChavezGarcia, 57 . Land grants to women were uncommon. Ascencion"s participation may have been a strategic ploy to assist her brother in obtaining a larger than allowed grant. Originally, Juan and Ascencion requested a grant of over 70,000 acres, five leagues greater than the maximum eleven leagues that could be granted to an individual. When Indians of the mission contested the request, arguing that under the secularization plan all of the former mission land should be left for common use, the grant was reduced to three leagues. It was the wedding of sixteen-year-old daughter Concepcion in 1836 that seemed to set the family on an unfortunate path. Concepcion was married to her first cousin, Servulo Varelas, whose landless family had spiraled downward after the death of his mother, Antonio Ygnacio's sister, when he was very young. Servulo's father was subsequently unable to control the sexuality of his two motherless daughters, who went on to have thirteen out-of-wedlock children between them, one even being publicly branded a "mala vida" just prior to Servulo's marriage.
Most likely Antonio Ygnacio was acting out of a sense of patriarchal responsibility to provide a better life for his nephew, although it is hard to believe that Concepcion would have any enthusiasm for sacrificing her virtue in the face of the shamed status of the Varelas family. 14 It is nearly impossible to imagine that the Avila family would soon and again become connected through marriage with another equally notorious family. Jose Martin remarried in the early 1840s to a widow who could also trace her roots to early settlers, but her family had been marred by shame when her sister was executed by vigilantes in 1836, for having abetted her lover in killing her elite ranchero husband. Perhaps at this point Antonio Ygnacio gave up on Padron, 395; 1850 Census, 62, 66; Chavez-Garcia, 46 . For a discussion of the effect of sexual impropriety and out-of wedlock births on the reputation of the family, see ibid., 26, 45 ("women who dishonored . . . fathers with sexual indiscretions brought dishonor to the entire family"). Chavez-Garcia argues that the label "mala vida" did not indicate that the woman was a prostitute, but nonetheless was an attempt by authorities outside the family to control these women"s sexuality and to make them serve as an example to other women. Ibid., 47-48. Sexual misconduct was not confined to this arm of the Varelas family. Servulo"s aunt produced three children during a period of widowhood and later was ordered by officials to leave her lover and return to her second husband. Ibid., 41; Los Angeles Plaza Church Baptismal Record nos. 00001, 00096, 00196. In addition, after he was married, Servulo agreed to have a cousin, who was charged with prostitution, placed under his watch. Chavez-Garcia, 190 n.28. 
THE WILL CONTEST
Rosa presented her husband's will to the Los Angeles County Probate Court and petitioned to be appointed co-executor along with sons Juan and Pedro Antonio. Gone were the days of "the civil-law easy-going, not judicially supervised, settlement of the affairs of a decedent" during the Mexican period. The State of California had established an estate administration process that was based on "the Anglo-American concept of fiduciary management under a close judicial supervision." The new system not only decreased the executors' control over estate administration, but it also allowed room for individual interests to trump those of the family. 18 Exploiting a contradiction in the law's notice requirement, Marta was able to delay the proceedings to admit the will to probate long enough to formulate a challenge to its validity.
During the Mexican period, Californianas had a long history of seeking judicial resolution of disputes, through procedures that respected Californio social and family heirarchy. 19 If Marta believed that resort to Anglo-American legal process would feel the same, then she sorely underestimated the bite of the adversarial system. Avila Probate, Petition to Admit Will to Probate and for Appointment of Executors, Notice of Hearing, Oct. 4, 1858; Powell, 178. 19 Motion to Dismiss, October 15, 1858, and November 1, 1858; Opposition to Probate of Will, November 1, 1858, Avila Probate. Under Mexican law, Marta would have needed her husband"s permission to bring a lawsuit. Arrom, 67. Here, Marta"s husband"s name was included in the caption of the will contest and there is no evidence that he opposed her filing of the suit. Meanwhile, focusing on Mexico City, Arrom states that "[f]amily members could not, as a general rule, bring suit or testify against eachother." Ibid., 307 n.69. But see ibid., 67 (noting that she was allowed to sue her husband without his permission). Californianas were not shy about seeking judicial resolution of disputes, including disputes against husbands. See ChavezGarcia, passim; Haas, esp. Ch. 2.; Langum, Ch. 9.
Marta's claims centered on a lifetime gift of cattle to her brother Juan memorialized in the will. Antonio Ygnacio recounted entrusting 800 head of cattle to Juan in 1842, praised him for increasing the herd to 2,000 head over the next eight years, and declared that any further increase in the herd during his lifetime would belong to Juan. 20 With a cattle market focused on hides and tallow and Antonio Ygnacio in failing health, the gift may have appeared reasonable at the time. However, the 1850s were boon years for Southern California rancheros as the Gold Rush set off an unprecedented market for beef soon after the will was executed. Moreover, Antonio Ygnacio survived an additional eight years. 21 From the vantage point of 1858, Antonio Ygnacio's gift to Juan now looked scandalously generous, even detrimental to the family's interest.
It may have been the gift's violation of Californio family economy norms that motivated Marta to seek its avoidance, but she had to present her arguments in the context of American legal culture and doctrine. Nineteenth-century American law was increasingly individualistic; it cared little about family cohesion and filial respect once children reached adulthood, and the Spanish/Mexican doctrine of patria potestas was irrelevant. In the American law of estates, the measure of the validity of a gift or will was not its accordance with family interests, but instead the focus was on the capacity and state of mind of the individual donor. 22
20
The will stated: "On the Ranch of my son Juan, I placed eight hundred (800) head of meat cattle. Eight years ago and through the cares of this good son who has worked in the increase and preservation of this stock with his own horses and servants, I had wherewith to maintain me the greater part of my old age, with my family; and which to pay many of my debts . . . which all of my family is informed, and I declare that my aforesaid son Juan has paid part of my liabilities with his own money, and that only by his care and expenses has my cattle been able to amount at this date to the amount of two thousand head . . . . " Will Translation. This declaration was essentially an inter vivos (lifetime) gift that would begin taking effect upon the birth of additional cows from Antonio Ygnacio"s herd at Rancho Niguel and would continue until Antonio Ygnacio"s death. Having been close witness to her father's declining health in the 1840s, Marta contended that the lifetime gift to Juan was void, either because her father lacked the capacity by 1850 to make the gift or because Juan procured the gift through fraud. In addition, Marta argued that the will itself was void, due to lack of testamentary capacity or by virtue of Juan's fraud and undue influence in securing favorable provisions. According to Marta, by 1850 Antonio Ygnacio had already been "incompetent by reason of mental imbecility and unsoundness of mind to transact any business or to make said will" for several years. She acknowledged that Juan had become his father's agent some time before the will was executed, but argued that this arrangement resulted from Antonio Ygnacio's diminished capacities rather than any agreement between the two. If so, American law might provide Juan with the value of his services, but that figure would not be tied to the increasing value of the cattle. 23 Alternatively, Marta contended that Juan committed fraud by underreporting by 2,500 head the number of Antonio Ygnacio's cattle that had been born on Rancho Niguel between 1842 and 1850. According to the terms of the gift, such an underreporting would allow Juan to lay claim to significantly more cattle and profits between 1850 and 1858 than he would otherwise be entitled to. Should Marta prevail, the excess cattle and profits would become a part of her father's probate estate, to be divided among her and her siblings. Marta's focus on this personal property, in the context of the vast real property included in this estate, was a product of both deep-seated culture and more recent economics. Unlike Anglos, Californios had not commodified their land, and livestock was seen as families' source of wealth. 24 Even still, it is hard to imagine that this lawsuit was really about additional cattle.
Evidence of fraud on Juan's part was circumstantial at best. The day before his father died, Juan sought and received a conservatorship. 25 Perhaps he had an inkling that his sister was Guardianship of Jose (Antonio Ygnacio) Avila, Case No. 115, Los Angeles County Probate Court Records (stating that Antonio Ygnacio was "imbecile in mind and wholly incompetent to manage his said property"). The Probate Court prepared to contest his handling of his father's affairs and he became worried that his informal management would not withstand the scrutiny of American law. And certain provisions in the will could be read as ham-handed attempts by Juan to cover his tracks. While the will acknowledged uneven treatment of Antonio Ygnacio's children, both with regard to lifetime and testamentary gifts, it justified the inequality as being motivated by love tempered by "justice in favor of those who have been most meritorious," a statement certain to exacerbate rather than temper hard feelings. The will also blatently implored the siblings not to cause trouble over the uneven treatment, with a pointed reference to Juan: "I wish, and it is my will that no one disturb him for reason of the increase [in the herd] nor for other cause whatsoever, since I am satisfied that he has conducted himself very well." According to Marta, these provisions were Juan's idea, "the better to conceal his frauds . . . and to protect himself," and agreed to by Antonio Ygnacio only due to his "imbecility" and vulnerability to Juan's undue influence. 26 Juan Avila was probably the last Californio his countrymen would expect to be accused, by a younger sister no less, of dishonorable behavior. By 1858, he was one of the most elite and wealthy members of San Juan Capistrano. If anything marked a gente de razon, it was his reputation as a man of reason, a man of his word. Elite Californios embraced a sense of reciprocity and obligation, where wealth was merely the means to act honorably. Acting in a self-interested, acquisitive way was unacceptable. 27 granted Juan a temporary appointment as conservator. If Marta had been inclined to contest this arrangement, she never had the opportunity; Antonio Ygnacio died the next day. It would be difficult to explain Marta's radical step of suing her eldest brother if there had not been some sort of estrangement between her and her family, including a breakdown in the patriarchal structure and family economy so critical to Californio culture. Certainly, the decampment to San Juan Capistrano in the mid-1830s of her siblings who wed well, the series of odd and even shame-ridden marriages of other siblings beginning around the same time, and Antonio Ygnacio's declining health in the 1840s indicate that the family had ceased functioning as a patriarchal unit long ago, perhaps the dysfunction only temporarily masked by a booming cattle market in the 1850s. The gift to Juan may have simply been the breaking point, while Marta's marriage, coming on the heels of the execution of Antonio Ygnacio's will, may hold clues to explain her decision to sue.
Perhaps Marta had married against her family's wishes, and, unable to stop the wedding, Surprising, however, Juan and his wife, Soledad served as witnesses to the Avila-Padilla wedding. Perhaps the family was relieved that Marta, at such an advanced age, could find any up north. While it is unlikely that Padilla was able to escape his reputation entirely, there is some indication that, by the later 1850s, he was considered a respected member of the Los Angeles community. See n. 30.
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Regarding the place of an eldest son, see Monroy, 141 (quoting Jose Sepulveda, husband of Juan"s sister Francisca, that the eldest son ""stood in the position of father to the family"" upon the death of the patriarch). Regarding Juan"s noninvolvement in military and political matters, see Bancroft, v. 19, 736 (noting that Avila "avoided political complications"); Diaries of Judge Hayes (describing Avila as one who "seemed to get along smoothly, 'minding his own business'"); See also Saddleback Ancestors, 22 ("[w] hile many relatives played hostile roles in the periodic controversies, Don Juan usually pursued the course of conciliator"). Regarding Avila"s role in the American victory at Los Angeles, see Juan Avila Testimonio, [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] spouse, and willing to overlook Padilla's pedigree. But circumstances point to a darker possibility, that this marriage was actually arranged by the eldest son over his sister's objections.
Perhaps Juan was simply worried that his sister would remain dependent on the family, but more likely he was nervous that the social and legal changes wrought by the Americanization of California had left this particular family ill-equipped to guard the sexuality of an unmarried, legally emancipated adult daughter. (After all, he had only to look at his deceased aunt's family, the Varelases, to see the manifestations of a lack of parental control over daughters.) The church marriage record notes that an impediment had to be overcome before the couple could marry.
Might Marta have indicated to the priest, early on, that she did not consent to the marriage, only to capitulate later in the engagement? 30 On the one hand, Marta's choice to sue her brother can be explained by the Americanization of law and society in post-statehood Los Angeles. Spanish-Mexican law gave wives as much of an identity before the law as husbands, and women were not shy about defending their rights both pre-conquest, but Spanish/Mexican law had not permitted family members to sue eachother. 31 Thus, these women may have been uniquely positioned to take advantage of the individualistic nature of American law in order to act on a modern sense of rights contrary to the Californio tradition of family unity. Such an explanation situates Marta's lawsuit as an attempt not only to gain a better deal for herself than if she had she kept quiet 30 Los Angeles Plaza Church Marriage Record no. 209. Interestingly, the wedding did not take place at the church, but instead at the San Juan Capistrano rancho of the Avilas" first cousin, who was particularly close to Juan, which may have allowed the event to be kept more private. Ibid. Indicating at least some sort of a relationship between Padilla and Avila, in 1858, the same year that Marta sued her brother, he and her husband both served as officers in the Democratic party in Los Angeles. Griswold del Castillo, Haas notes Californianas' sense of entitlement to the land, which "rested, in part, on the fact that Spanish and Mexican law gave them the right to control their property and wealth and to litigate on questions related to their person, their families, and their holdings." Haas, 81. Arrom, 307n.69. during the probate process, but also to undermine her brother's public reputation and eliminate his ability to control the administration of the estate.
But the work of historian Miroslava Chavez-Garcia offers another explanation that locates Marta with a foot in each culture. Californio patriarchy was not marked merely by a daughter's obedience to her father. Instead, it was defined by a reciprocity of obligations insisted upon by Californianas not afraid to resort to official enforcement. As Chavez-Garcia notes, daughters seeking to hold their fathers accountable were not attempting to overthrow the system of patriarchy, but instead were seeking "to challenge patriarchal authority figures who had failed to behave according to the gender and social roles prescribed for them." 32 Perhaps this lawsuit was an action not only against a brother who allegedly dishonored the family and disrupted its economy by acting in a self-interested way, but also, in abstentia, against a father who failed in his duties to his youngest daughter. 33 Yet, even if Marta was motivated by Californianas' traditional use of the courts, her case was facilitated by changes in the law a few years after statehood that gave children a present, individualized interest in their father's estate. The new order provided a greater incentive to contest a parent's will and allowed children to do so during the lifetime of their widowed mother.
Meanwhile, the challenge to Antonio Ygancio's will would take place, not in the conciliatory setting of the Mexican dispute resolution process, but in the adversarial setting of the AngloAmerican legal system. This was a system that cared little about the cost of a lawsuit -financial,
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Chavez-Garcia, xviii, 26. Chavez-Garcia notes that women were not always successful in these actions, as "courts interpreted the law in ways that reflected deeply rooted gender biases." Ibid, 26. 33 If Marta saw herself acting out of filial duty, it is worth noting that she received no assistance from her other siblings. Only niece and nephew Juana and Guadalupe Sanchez, heirs of their deceased mother Ascencion, joined in the will contest. Perhaps they felt they have been short-changed in the settlement of their mother"s estate, and perhaps they believed Juan played a role. The details of the distribution of Ascencion"s estate are unknown except that the administrator, eldest son Tomas, failed to include two hijas naturale (children born outside of marriage). (In her widowhood, Ascencion gave birth to two additional children by Governor Pio Pico.) See "The Avila Heirs," Los Angeles Times, Sept. 9, 1895. emotional, or otherwise. Marta probably had no idea what she was getting into when she hired an American lawyer to represent her interests in an American court. 34 The will contest would be tried before a jury in District Court. In the end, it was the battle over jury instructions that was determinative. Marta primarily focused on the issue of whether her father lacked testamentary capacity, almost ignoring the more incendiary charge that Juan had engaged in dishonest behavior. According to Marta, her father lacked capacity if he did not fully understand "the whole of said will in all its parts and the results" that would flow from the provisions. Juan argued that Antonio Ygnacio would have had to be "totally deprived of reason"; "imbecility of mind in the Testator merely, will not avoid his last will and testament."
Marta's position would have required Juan to admit just how disabled his father had become by 1850. Perhaps Juan was reaching for a shred of pride for the old man, grasping for any outcome that would preserve his father's memory as the hero Juan believed him to be. Juan never lost his reverence for Antonio Ygnacio, and, twenty years after his death, impossibly remembered his father as a good horseback rider, "a faculty which he did not lose up to the last moment of his life." 35
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The goal of the Mexican dispute resolution system was to do the least harm to the community, even if that meant shortchanging an individual. Chavez-Garcia, 66. For changes in inheritance law, see Powell, 200. For Mexican property and inheritance law, see Arrom, 63, [67] [68] 91 . Griswold del Castillo notes the difficulties that Californios faced in hiring attorneys from the all-Anglo bar in Los Angeles. While these lawyers were quite content to represent their interests, Californios were handicapped by the lack of Spanish-speaking lawyers. Interestingly, Marta"s attorney, Jonathan Scott, was one of the few who did have some facility with the language. Griswold del Castillo, [116] [117] Until 1862, the Probate Court lacked the power to convene a jury, so issues of fact were certified to the district court for resolution. See D.P. Occupying the bench was Judge Benjamin Hayes, who was charged with deciding which instructions would be submitted to the jury. Hayes accepted Juan's over Marta's , even though Marta's represented the more common standard of testamentary capacity. Nonetheless, the first jury deadlocked in late 1858. After a second trial, before an all-Anglo jury, a verdict was reached the following April. The jury found that in fact Antonio Ygnacio was of "sound and disposing mind" when he executed his will, and that he did not do so "under undue influence or restraint," or "under fraudulent representation." But perhaps there was more to this verdict than simply the jury applying law favorable to Juan. Given that filial obligations and a sense of a Sadly, the cattle that was so valuable at the start of the will contest ultimately While the first jury summons contained a few Californio names, the second jury was assembled from a nearly all-Anglo panel. With Antonio Ygnacio"s long deterioration more likely to be known in the Californio community, an Anglo jury favored Juan. The experience in the second trial is consistent with Griswold del Castillo"s larger finding that Californios and Mexicans "were conspicuously absent on [Los Angeles] juries." Data for 1863, a few years after this trial, demonstrates that Spanish-surnamed men made up only 13% of all petit and grand juries, while comprising nearly 60% of the population. Griswold del Castillo, [117] [118] would eat away at the estate itself, requiring sale of assets. To avoid this, the defendants obtained an order that Marta and her nieces pay the estate's legal costs out of their separate property. But the women made successive appeals to the California Supreme Court. The high court upheld the jury's verdict in the will contest but the women were eventually relieved of the order to pay costs. These appeals further drove up the costs of administration, setting a pattern that was to haunt the estate until the end. 37
A LEGACY LOST
The will contest appeared to exact a psychic toll from both Marta and Juan. Once the will was admitted to probate, Juan declined to serve as an executor because it would be "inconvenient." Yet Juan may also have wanted to distance himself from the public display of family discord and move on with his independent life. Soon after, both siblings distanced themselves further from their father's estate by selling off their interests, which included the lands of the rancho,a move thoroughly inconsistent with Californio cultural norms that emphasized the connection between the land and the family unit. 38 Marta sold her interest to an outsider, Scotsman Robert Burnett, and when he purchased the adjacent rancho the following year, a plan dangerous to the Avila family's interests emerged.
Under Mexican law, Burnett would have had no incentive, and really no opportunity, to buy into 37 the Avila estate. Mexican law had discouraged the alienability of granted land in order to keep the ranchos intact and in the family. The land could pass only through inheritance to family members, typically the children. Once the land became co-owned, further restrictions kept the grant intact. The widow, who took her share as common property, was given a use right in the children's share. No matter their age, children had to wait until their mother's death to assert any legal control over their share. And joint owners could assert only an undivided interest: they had no claim to particular acreage. Moreover, there was little motivation to seek individual, parceled ownership of grazing acreage: in a grazing economy where land was plentiful, it was more important to assert ownership over a particular animal than a defined piece of land. 39 By the time of Antonio Ygnacio's death, the California legislature had upended this scheme. The law eliminated the widow's use rights, and now permitted actions for partition, allowing one co-owner to seek a particular piece of the property or to ask the court to sell the property and divide the proceeds. Only the inability of the property to be divided or sold would stop a partition; that the property may have been more valuable if kept intact was irrelevant.
These changes in the law severely undermined the unity of family interest that permeated Californio culture. Now, individual interests in a rancho were more marketable, to more people, earlier in an heir's lifetime. Thus, the law now facilitated heirs like Marta and Juan, who wanted distance themselves from their families and from what could be an arduous probate process, even if doing so was not in the best interest of the family economy. 40 The threat of a Burnett partition action now hovered over the estate, but Burnett appeared to value more the legal right of standing, which allowed any interest-holder, no matter how insignificant, to invoke the oversight of the court in the estate administration. Each time this oversight was invoked, the costs of administering the estate would rise. to order cash payments for legal fees was magnified in the cash-poor economy of Southern California, and Californios had to sell assets of the estate to pay these costs. Consequently, for a relatively modest sum, Burnett was able to buy his way into a position where he could affect the devolution of the entire rancho. 41 The costs of the will contest had bored down on the estate just as the booming cattle market began collapsing in the early 1860s. To meet these obligations, Pedro Antonio first sold livestock, which brought in about a third less than the appraised value. Beginning in 1865, he Burnett had an initial Order of Sale for the rancho set aside on the basis of lack of notice and other defects in 1865. He portrayed his concern as one of an interest-holder seeking to convey a valid, unencumbered title. The Supreme Court's reasoning, while faulty, provided only a temporary roadblock to sale of the real property, which was all that Burnett needed. Burnett's actions drove the costs of administration even higher. With the debts of the estate now amounting to nearly $8,400, Burnett had Pedro Antonio right where he wanted him. Pedro Antonio now had no choice but to liquidate all of the real estate. He filed yet another Petition for Order of Sale in January, 1868.
There now being no opposition, the court ordered the sale of "All that certain lot or parcel of land known as the Sausal Redondo rancho," these cryptic words not even beginning to capture the Avila family's loss. On the appointed day, April 18, 1868, Burnett, living on the adjoining rancho, was ready to purchase all 22,500 acres, which he did for $29,550. 43 
CONCLUSION
A few years after Burnett purchased Rancho Sausal Redondo, a grandson of Antonio Ygnacio hatched a plan to return the property to the family. Tomas Sanchez, Ascencion's son, had been elected Sheriff of Los Angeles County from 1860-67, one of just a few Californios to successfully plant a separate foot in the rapidly Anglicizing Los Angeles. Adopting Avila as his middle name, he became the face of his family's interests, notwithstanding that his uncles were still alive. The terms of patriarchy were now being negotiated on an American stage, where generational differences mattered less and positions of public leadership and honor would be claimed by those garnering the most votes. After convincing his aunts, uncles, siblings and cousins to quitclaim to him their interests in the rancho, he filed suit against Burnett, alleging a fraudulent conspiracy between him and Pedro Antonio to run up expenses of administration in order to trigger a sale of Sausal Redondo. The lawsuit failed. 44 In pursuing his claim, what Sanchez did not acknowledge was that the first domino along the path to losing the land fell not because of an outsider's wrongdoing, but because a daughter was unwilling to swallow what she perceived as an injustice inside her own family. Whether she perceived the injustice as to her, her father, or her family, we will never know. However, had Sanchez acknowledged Marta's role, he would have had to look back further to see that his family had, years before Antonio Ygnacio's death, already experienced a fatal weakening of the patriarchy, honor, and devotion to family economy so crucial to holding the rancho enterprise together. And had he looked forward from his grandfather's death, he would have seen how vulnerable this family was to further erosion by the Americanization of law and society, where individual interests trumped the collective good. By 1868, the idea of the land meant little to this fractured family, with only a grandson's nostalgic yearning to keep the cause alive. To the Avila family, each pocketing the few dollars doled out from the sale of their legacy, modernity tasted bitter indeed. 
